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CONSTRUCTION, ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION AND THE 
COMPLETE CONSTITUTION 
Richard S. Kay∗ 
In recent years, the literature of constitutional originalism has adopted a new concept, 
“constitutional construction.”  This Essay critically examines that concept. Contrary to some 
claims, the difference between “interpretation” and “construction” is not well established in 
common law adjudication.  Contemporary descriptions of constitutional construction end up 
leaving some ill-defined discretion in the hands of constitutional decision-makers.  Finally, the 
Essay disputes the claim that constitutional construction is unavoidable because the 
constitutional text is inherently incomplete.  It fails to provide a decision-rule for many—
indeed for most—constitutional disputes.  This conclusion follows, however,only when the 
Constitution is interpreted according to the “new” or “public meaning” version of 
originalism.  At least in the context of constitutional adjudication, originalist interpretation 
seeking to identify the meaning of the text that was actually intended by the people whose 
assent made it law, leaves no indeterminate constitutional controversies.  In every argument 
about the application of a constitutional provision to an actual dispute, one side’s 
interpretation will always better conform to that original meaning.  In that sense, at least, the 
Constitution is complete. 
INTRODUCTION  
In the last few years the literature of originalist constitutional interpreta-
tion and application has featured a new concept—” constitutional construc-
tion.”  Construction has been distinguished from constitutional interpreta-
tion more strictly defined.1  Lawrence Solum, one of its most prolific 
proponents, explains the distinction this way: 
“Constitutional interpretation” is the activity that discerns the communicative 
content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text.  “Constitutional con-
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 1 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2357-58 (2015) 
(characterizing construction as an “accessory to interpretation”); Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. 
Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1269 (2015) 
(distinguishing between construction and interpretation); Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Consti-
tution or Classical Liberal Construction?, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 814 (2014) (claiming 
that it is now the “standard” to differentiate between construction and interpretation). See gener-
ally Symposium, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (2013) 
(discussing the methods of constitutional interpretation, and examining the possibility that “con-
stitutional construction theory” has become a “supplement to interpretation”); Symposium, The 
Interpretation/Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law 27 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2010) 
(exploring the “implications of the interpretation-construction distinction”). 
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struction” is the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine 
and the legal effect of the constitutional text.2 
Interpretation and construction, that is, correspond to two different 
moments in the process of any decision controlled by an authoritative legal 
text.  The text describes some set of facts and the consequences that should 
follow when those facts obtain.  The first stage of decision, interpretation, 
is the process of apprehending the nature of the posited state of affairs and 
the designated consequences.  In the second stage, construction, the deci-
sion-maker, armed with this understanding, determines if the rule so inter-
preted applies to a particular concrete situation and, if so, what actions 
must be taken to effect the appropriate consequences. 
It is hard to deny the conceptual distinctness of these two kinds of activ-
ities.3  More controversial is the further claim that construction, the produc-
tion of the “juridical meaning . . . authorized by the legal text,” may not be 
fully determined by the contents of that text.  A determinate construction, 
that is, does not always follow automatically from a given interpretation.  A 
critical premise of this conclusion is that the text cannot, by itself, supply 
answers in many constitutional controversies.  In these cases, says Keith 
Whittington, the act of construction necessarily “involve[s] judgments and 
choices about how best to resolve. . .[textual] indeterminacies.”4  On some 
occasions, therefore, in some circumstances and at least to some extent, 
constitutional construction is independent of the constitutional text.  This 
Essay disputes the essential premise on which this reasoning is based.  For 
the purposes of constitutional adjudication, the Constitution is complete.  It 
is always sufficient to identify the better argument in litigated constitution-
al cases.  Constitutional construction, therefore, is as unnecessary as it is in 
tension with the purposes of constitutional government. 
Part I reviews the claim that the distinction between the interpretation 
and construction of texts has been a common and well-established legal 
 
 2 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 
457 (2013) (hereinafter Solum, Originalism). See also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Con-
struction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 65, 66 (2011) (hereinafter Barnett, Interpretation) (“In-
terpretation is the activity of identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use of language in 
context. Construction is the activity of applying that meaning to particular factual circumstanc-
es.”). 
 3 There is reason to doubt that, in practice, there is any clear temporal separation between interpre-
tation and application. Understanding will often unfold in the course of application. Solum 
properly points out that the two conceptually distinct stages will appear to collapse in cases in 
which the meaning of the relevant text is clear and unambiguous on its face. Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 117-18 (2010) (hereinaf-
ter Solum, Interpretation-Construction). 
 4 Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 
122 (2010) (hereinafter Whittington, Constructing.) 
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concept “for the last two centuries.”5  Part II describes how constitutional 
construction has been explained and applied by its academic defenders.  It 
concludes that construction—as it appears in the current literature—leaves 
a wide discretion to officials and especially to judges employing it.  Part III 
critically examines the claim that construction is unavoidable because legal 
texts are inherently incomplete, so mere interpretation of the Constitution 
cannot yield an answer to every disputed question about its proper applica-
tion.  Therefore, something else, something like constitutional construction, 
is necessary to resolve those disputes.  This reasoning makes sense but only 
when coupled with a particular version of originalist interpretation, one that 
has as its object the “original public meaning” of the Constitution at the 
time of enactment.  I show that this reasoning is unwarranted if we adopt an 
alternative understanding of originalist interpretation, one that seeks the 
meaning of the constitutional rules that was actually intended by the people 
whose decisions made the Constitution law.  Understood that way, the 
Constitution is, at least in the context of constitutional litigation, complete:  
It will always be possible to find that one party’s interpretation of the Con-
stitution better fits the original meaning than the other’s. 
I. AN “ANCIENT” DISTINCTION 
Recent expositions of constitutional construction have sometimes de-
scribed and defended it as a well-established American legal practice.  
They have also insisted that the separate meanings of “construction” and 
“interpretation” are of “ancient vintage.”6  Until the appearance of the re-
cent academic literature on construction, however, “construction” and “in-
terpretation” have almost always been used interchangeably.  In a recent 
decision, for example, the United States Supreme Court casually treated the 
two terms as referring to the same process: “As with all statutory interpre-
tation questions, construction of [legislation] must begin with the plain lan-
guage of the statute.”7 
It is true that as far back as the first half of the nineteenth century, one 
can find academic commentary as well as some judicial opinions that use 
these terms in a way similar to that described above.  But these cases are 
 
 5 E.g., Lawrence Solum, Graber on the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Panel at the AALS, 
LEGAL THEORY BLOG, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/01/graber-on-the-
interpretationconstruction-distinction-panel-at-the-aals.html (Jan. 13, 2010). 
 6 Barnett, Interpretation at 65. 
 7 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 542 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Miller v. French, 
530 U.S. 327, 358 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asking if a certain “interpretation” was a “rea-
sonable construction” of a statute, essentially treating the two terms as interchangeable); 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
13-15 (2012) (acknowledging the distinction between interpretation and construction in academic 
discourse, but pointing out that the Court has yet to adopt this distinction). 
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rare. Far more prevalent has been the use of these two words as synonyms.  
Almost all of the exceptions, moreover, are traceable to a single and highly 
idiosyncratic source, Francis Lieber’s 1839 treatise, Legal and Political 
Hermeneutics.8  The first, 1920, edition of Samuel Williston’s treatise on 
The Law of Contracts compared interpretation, seeking “the sense which 
[the] author intended to convey” with construction, the “drawing of conclu-
sions “in the spirit though not the letter of the text.”  Williston’s principal 
authority was Lieber.9  The first, 1891, edition of Sutherland’s Statutes and 
Statutory Construction noted the difference between construction and in-
terpretation, but only in connection with “Dr. Lieber’s definition,” and 
mainly as a warning against departing from the legislature’s expressed in-
tentions based on some “extraneous consideration or theory of construc-
tion.”10  When we turn to testamentary instruments (where the distinct uses 
of construction and interpretation most clearly persist)11 we see much the 
same thing. William Page’s 1901 A Concise Treatise on the Law of Wills 
agrees that “[i]n the most technically accurate use of language Construction 
should probably be distinguished from . . . Interpretation” and quotes 
Lieber’s definitions.12  Like Sutherland, however, Page found these “philo-
sophical” usages “cut[] sharply across the distinctions and classifications 
which have in the past in actual practice been observed by the courts. . .;” 
therefore, he gave them no further attention.13 
Francis Lieber, the instigator of this terminology, was a German immi-
grant who became a prominent nineteenth century authority in numerous 
fields of American law.  According to Paul Carrington, when Lieber died in 
1872, he was “without serious question the most eminent legal scholar in 
 
 8 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1839) (Legal Classics Library ed. 
1994). 
 9 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1159-60 and note 3. Williston also cited (“see 
also”) 2 WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS s. 1505 (1913).  El-
liott’s meaning, however, was quite different. He used the term “construction” to emphasize the 
need to take into account “the whole transaction” in order to give effect to the contract that the 
parties “intended to make and upon which their minds met.”  Williston went on to say that the 
distinction between interpretation and construction is “of no legal consequence” in the law of 
contracts. 
 10 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 311-12 (1891) 
 11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS s. 11.3, Com-
ment c. (2000) (describing interpretation as “the process of searching for the donor’s actual in-
tention” and construction as “designat[ing] the final product of the process of determining the 
meaning” but insisting they are “not completely distinct processes . . . nor are they applied se-
quentially.”) In contrast, the drafters of the first Restatement apparently wished to distinguish 
construction (the judicial ascertainment of the “intent of the conveyor”) from the “ascertainment 
of the effect of an instrument in light of controlling rules of law.” That Restatement eschewed the 
word interpretation altogether, leaving the term to questions associated with the meaning of con-
tracts, while acknowledging that, for the most part, “the two words are identical in meaning.” 3 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY S. 241, COMMENTS C. AND E. (1940). 
 12 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS, 533 (1901). 
 13 Id. at 533-34. 
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America.”14  When we look at just what Lieber meant by construction, 
however, we find a hodge-podge of activities related to legal texts.  The on-
ly unifying thread seems to be that each of the several kinds of “construc-
tion” involved judicial correction of textual imperfections.  These difficul-
ties covered a range of issues.  For example, statutes that were obscure or 
contained obvious drafting errors were to be repaired with “constructions” 
that were more in line with the intended goals of the legislation.15  This 
kind of construction, of course, had long been practiced as “interpreta-
tion.”16 
Lieber, however, also advocated construction to correct errors not of 
legislative expression but of judgment.  Thus he approved the 1835 sugges-
tion of the postmaster-general that post offices should refuse to deliver “in-
cendiary” abolitionist literature even though such a policy was found in “no 
part of the post law.”  The postal service, Lieber reasoned, “ought not to aid 
in destructive measures.”17  This “transcendent construction” was justified 
on the ground that an apparent meaning had to yield to “a principle superi-
or to the text.”18  The basis of this kind of construction, as the example 
shows, was an evaluation of social welfare.  “The effects, which would re-
sult from one or the other construction may guide us in deciding which 
construction we ought to adopt.”19  A constitutional text, moreover, was not 
immune to such improvement, “[T]he ‘public welfare,’” he insisted, “‘is 
the supremest law of every country, is above the supreme law.’”20  Lieber, 
to be sure, repeatedly warned against possible misuse of “transcendent con-
struction,” insisting that it be used infrequently and only when “we have a 
proper conception of the public welfare.”21  At the end, however, Lieber’s 
descriptions of the various categories of construction provided little guid-
ance to officials charged with implementing binding legal texts.  They 
boiled down to a general injunction to do the right thing, all things consid-
ered. 
The obscurity of Lieber’s notions, however, has turned out to be largely 
irrelevant.  Overwhelmingly, judges and commentators have treated the 
words “interpretation” and “construction” as referring to the same activity. 
Lawrence Solum has cited eleven opinions referring to the distinction be-
 
 14 Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2135, 2144 (1994). 
 15 LIEBER, supra note 8 at 56-57. 
 16 See e.g., 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:37 (7th ed.); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 
Constitutional Implications Revisited, 30 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 9, 13-15 (2011) (examining more 
traditional forms of “interpretation”). 
 17 LIEBER, supra note 8 at 78-79. 
 18 Id. at 77 (emphasis supplied). 
 19 Id. at 144. 
 20 Id. at 181. 
 21 Id. at 182. 
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tween the two terms.  These judgments were rendered in seven different 
courts from 1934 to 1999.22  One was a wills case where, as noted, the con-
struction has had a somewhat different history.23  The other ten involved 
the application of contract law.  Eight of these ten dealt with the same prob-
lem, namely which disputed issues should be treated as questions of fact 
and which as questions of law.24  Nine of the ten contracts cases, moreover, 
cited Corbin on Contracts as authority for the distinction.  The history of 
the Corbin reference illustrates the failure of the separate usages to take 
hold.  In his first edition, published in 1950, Corbin posited a difference be-
tween the interpretation of language and the construction (the “effect upon 
the action of courts”) of contracts.  He conceded that “these two words are 
often used in the same sense,” but insisted that “the fact that confused us-
age is the prevailing usage is not a good reason for adhering to it.”  None of 
the cases Corbin cited in that first edition actually employed the distinct 
senses he defended.25  Still, as Solum’s cases illustrate, Corbin’s adoption 
of the terminology itself led to its citation in several appellate decisions.26  
The treatise has now gone through many editions and all of them have re-
peated the interpretation-construction distinction.  The latest edition also 
dutifully recites it but now it concludes with the statement that “[r]arely do 
courts articulate this distinction . . . .  Because of this overwhelmingly 
common practice of courts authoring opinions today, the distinction will 
not be further discussed in this Volume.”27 
 
 22 See Solum, Originalism at 486-87. Solum actually lists only nine cases but two of the citations 
refer to other judgements cited in those decisions. 
 23 See note 11 supra. Four of the contracts cases were decided in Iowa. Fausel v. JRJ Enterprises, 
Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1999); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783 
(Iowa 1988); Connie’s Constr. Co., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 207 (Iowa 
1975); Allen v. Highway Equip. Co., 239 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1976). 
 24 Fausel v. JRJ Enterprises, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1999); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance 
Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 1988); Connie’s Constr. Co., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1975); Allen v. Highway Equip. Co., 239 N.W.2d 135, 139 
(Iowa 1976); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 226 (Wash. 1990); Ram Const. Co., Inc. v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984); Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 
F.2d 165, 179 (5th Cir. 1970); In re XTI Xonix Technologies Inc., 156 B.R. 821, 829 n.6 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1993). The last case notes the distinction between interpretation and construction but it 
seems to play no role in the decision. In re XTI Xonix, 156 B.R. at 829 n.6. In one of the two 
other contract cases, the court termed the applicability of the contra proferentem rule a matter of 
law, one not dependent on the parties’ intentions and hence a matter of “construction.” Joyner v. 
Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. App. 1987). 
 25 See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES 
OF CONTRACT LAW, § 534 (1950). 
 26 The same may be said, although to a lesser extent, about the somewhat different description of 
the distinction in Williston’s contracts treatise first published in 1920. See text at note 9 supra. 
 27 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3, pp. 10-11 (1993). Compare Solum, Originalism at 487 (“[T]he 
distinction is common in American caselaw.”) 
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The truth, as already noted, is that construction and interpretation have 
been and continue to be treated as “perfect synonyms.”28  The second edi-
tion of Sedgwick’s treatise on The Interpretation and Construction of Stat-
utory and Constitutional Law, published in 1874, acknowledged Lieber’s 
categories and “similar discussions [that] have amused the fancy and ex-
hausted the arguments of text writers” but found they “aid us but little in 
our work.”  The index entry for “Interpretation, of statutes, treaties etc.” 
was “see ‘Construction.’”29 
II. WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION? 
It is impossible, therefore, to understand the recently elaborated idea of 
constitutional construction as just a variant of well-defined historical prac-
tice.  Nailing down its content is further complicated by the fact that the 
current incarnation has been used in connection with several distinct 
though overlapping ideas.30  In fact, it is not even clear which verb “con-
struction” nominalizes—“construe” or “construct.”  Randy Barnett says 
that originalists “need a normative theory for how to construe a Constitu-
tion when its meaning runs out.”31  That is also one of the ways thatLieber 
used the term.32  On the other hand, Keith Whittington refers to a meaning 
that “must be constructed from the political melding of the document with 
external interests and principles.”33  The choice is significant insofar as the 
act of “construing” suggests that the object of the activity is the text itself.  
A construction then is a version of or implication of a text.  “Constructing,” 
on the other hand, suggests the fashioning of something new.34  As I will 
attempt to show, the latter description better fits the creative activity put 
forward by the academic proponents of constitutional construction. To en-
gage in construction is definitionally to go beyond the constitutional text. 
 
 28 Michael Herz, Rediscovering Francis Lieber An Afterword and Introduction, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2107, 2128 (1995). See also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7 at 13, 15; Thomas B. Colby, 
The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L. J. 713, 767 (2011). In the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice McKenna cited and applied Lieber’s usage in two opinions (one a dissent) dealing with the 
meaning of congressional acts in 1906 and 1907. United States v. Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226, 229-
230 (1907); Blair v. City of Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 504 (1906), dissenting opinion); 
 29 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191, 677 (2d ed. J.N. Pomeroy, ed. 
1874). 
 30 Proliferating academic models of constituteional decision-making have afflicted the concepts of 
interpretation in general and originalist interpretation in particular. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.6 (2009). 
 31 Barnett, Interpretation, supra note 2 at 70. 
 32 See e.g., LIEBER, supra note 8 at 56. 
 33 Whittington, Constructing, supra note 4 at 1. See also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7 at 13. 
 34 See Whittington, Constructing, supra note 4 at 128 (referring to construction as a “creative 
task.”). 
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Constitutional construction is understood to be necessary whenever any 
person or entity must decide how the Constitution affects a particular situa-
tion.  Most significant for our purposes, however, is the construction per-
formed by courts in the course of resolving litigated constitutional disputes.  
These adjudications bind the litigants, including the government.  Con-
structions in cases that are pronounced by the constitutional court of last 
resort, moreover, are usually taken to bind everyone subject to the constitu-
tion in every similar situation.35  Judicial constitutional construction, there-
fore, contributes to the definition of the powers of the state and to the shape 
of civil society.  My focus in this Essay is the extent to which such judicial 
constitutional construction can be justified given widely shared assump-
tions about American constitutionalism.  First, however, it may be useful to 
clear the ground by describing two other ways in which the term has been 
used. 
In one influential formulation, constitutional construction signifies 
choices made by the political branches of government in using or not using 
the constitutional powers that belong to those branches.36  Over time, these 
choices create a “web of values, institutions, procedures and rights” that 
takes on normative force.37  But the resulting influence on subsequent deci-
sions-unlike the judicial process sketched above—are essentially political 
not legal.38  Such norms are familiar to students of Westminster govern-
ments as “constitutional conventions.”  According to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, “legal rules create wide powers, discretions and rights which con-
ventions prescribe should be exercised only in a certain limited manner if at 
all.”39  These conventions are emphatically not rules of law and are not en-
forceable in courts.40  They are “binding” in a political sense but they can 
be—and sometimes they have been—violated and sometimes abandoned 
 
 35 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (reasoning that the Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is by extension the “supreme law of the land”); Larry Alexander & Fred-
erick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) 
(defending the primacy of judicial interpretation of the Constitution).  The decisions of central-
ized constitutional courts are usually said to have erga omnes or universal force. See Juliane Ko-
kott & Martin Kaspar, Ensuring Constitutional Efficacy 795, 814 in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, eds., 2012). 
 36 Whittington, Constructing at 133. 
 37 Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 208 (1999) (hereinafter Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION). 
 38 Id. at ix. 
 39 Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 881 (reasons of Martland, Ritch-
ie, Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ.) See Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 224 (1999)(in the British context, powers may be legally available to the gov-
ernment, but convention may dictate that it is inappropriate to use them) 
 40 A. V. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxli (8th ed. 
1914, Liberty Classics Reprint 1982). 
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by political actors.41  If that were all that was meant by constitutional con-
struction, it would have a very limited role in constitutional adjudication.42 
A second innocuous use of the term, constitutional construction, refers 
to the application of a constitutional rule to a concrete situation.  Randy 
Barnett describes construction as “the activity of applying [the semantic] 
meaning [of given language] to particular factual circumstances.”43 Of 
course, this supposes we have already identified the “meaning” of the rule.  
If we know the meaning of a rule, we know what legal consequences ought 
to follow upon the occurrence of certain facts.  Just pronouncing those con-
sequences when the relevant facts present themselves can hardly be contro-
versial.  In fact, Lawrence Solum tries to show the ubiquitous quality of 
construction by describing this situation—when “a court simply translates 
the semantic content of the text into corresponding legal content and then 
applies that content to a particular case.”  When the “legal text is neither 
ambiguous nor vague,” moreover, “the act of construction may go unno-
ticed since it does no work in determining legal content.”  It might appear 
in such an instance that “interpretation does all the work” but that is only 
because the meaning of the text is so obvious that its application to the 
facts is inarguable.  Even so, “construction is always a step in the process 
of understanding and applying a legal text. . . .”44 
If that were all there was to constitutional construction, it would be en-
tirely consistent with conventional ideas about the interpretation and appli-
cation of legal texts.  But, as explained by its proponents, constructions that 
are far from mechanical will still legally bind.  This is apparent in another 
of Solum’s examples of the interpretation-construction sequence: “[W]hen 
a will violates the rule against perpetuities, a court may give the will a sav-
ing construction – this construction gives the will a legal effect that varies 
from the semantic content of the text.”45  In this case, “construction” is 
more than the simple application of the meaning of a previously interpreted 
text.  The “saving” construction that allows the will to be given effect is 
exactly something other than the semantic meaning of the text in question.  
It is rather the execution of a policy that cannot be inferred solely from the 
interpreted meaning of the will.  In this case, such a reformulation might be 
mandated by some hierarchically superior “law of wills” that controls how 
and when wills are to be given effect.  Likewise, the common law of con-
 
 41 Id. at 293, 303. For a dramatic example see Paul Scroon, SURVIVAL FOR SERVICE: MY 
EXPERIENCE AS GOVERNOR GENERAL OF GRENADA 159-60 (2003) (describing exercise of gov-
ernmental power by the Governor General of Grenada after the American invasion of 1983). 
 42 See Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 205-06 (“[O]riginalism “points out the 
space fof future constitutional development, without asserting judicial supremacy…”.). 
 43 Barnett, Interpretation at 66. 
 44 Solum, Interpretation-Construction at 103 n.19. 
 45 Id. 
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tract has been argued sometimes to require an application of a contract that 
neither party intended.46  In contrast, there is not—there can be no - supra-
constitutional law of constitutions, a law that controls and regulates the 
reach and effect of constitutional texts.47  The judge engaged in constitu-
tional construction can have no law to work with beyond the Constitution 
itself. 48 
The exponents of constitutional construction have suggested a number 
of very general factors that ought properly to inform the process of con-
struction.  One prominent theme is that construction should work out the 
large values that underlie the constitutional text.  Lieber described con-
struction as “the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond 
the direct expression of the text, from elements known from and given in 
the text.”49  Jack Balkin assumes that “constructions are always attempts at 
implementation” of the principles underlying the constitutional text and 
Randy Barnett declares construction to be “guided” by the text’s “general 
or abstract principles.”50  For example, after reading the Ninth and Four-
teenth Amendments, Barnett concludes that one permissible constitutional 
construction requires placing a “burden on the government to show that its 
restriction on any liberty is both necessary and proper.”  This presumption 
 
 46 See, e.g., Page, supra note 12 at 543-51; Arthur L. Corbin, 5-24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3 
(“Construction may produce a result which differs from the meanings that either or both parties 
assigned to the contract’s terms.”). 
 47 See Richard S. Kay, Original Intentions, Standard Meanings and the Legal Character of the 
Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 39, 48-49 (1989) (explaining that there can be no positive 
“law-behind-the-law” because the legal character of the Constitution is not attributable to prior 
law). In a recent article, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 10709 (2017), William 
Baude and Stephen Sachs argue that there is a “law of interpretation” that dictates how a court is 
to understand all legal texts including the Constitution. They suggest that the application of this 
law can reduce the indeterminacy associated with modern ideas of constitutional construction. Id. 
at 1140-41. It is an “unwritten law” that is to be inferred from legal practice. Id. at 1104-05. They 
do not, I think, adequately explain how this law gets its authority since they deny that it is an in-
ference from the rules that were promulgated by the constitution-makers. Id. They do say that it 
is a form of “general law.” Id. at 1137-39. The example they give of the application of such gen-
eral law is Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In rejecting Swift and its general law, Jus-
tice Brandeis expressed the now prevalent positivist view that “law in the sense in which courts 
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.” Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes J., dissenting)). 
 48 See Colby, supra note 28 at 770-71 (Constitution by definition, cannot control constitutional 
construction); Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism: A Comment on Jack Balkin’s 
“Living Originalism”, 7 JERUSALEM REV. OF LEG. STUD. 42, 47 (construction based on princi-
ples “disembodied from the text”). 
 49 Lieber, supra note 8 at 56. 
 50 Jack Balkin, LIVING ORIGINALISM 180 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 124 (rev. ed. 2014) (Randy E. Barnett & Restor-
ing, eds.). See also id. at 126 (“In this way, constitutional construction, though not deducible 
immediately from the text, still may properly be connected to or constrained by it.”). 
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arises even though there is no single rule or set of rules in the constitutional 
text that clearly requires it.51 
As Balkin puts it, “we must try to determine what principles underlie 
the text in order to build constructions that are consistent with it”; those 
principles, however, “are not limited to specific conceptions that the fram-
ers and ratifiers actually sought to endorse.”52  In sum, there is a relation-
ship between text and construction, but it is both imprecise and intrinsically 
controversial.  Construction “produces” legal norms that are not in the text, 
only associated with it.53 
The possibilities of constitutional construction, therefore, are wide.  The 
underlying “values or principles” of the Constitution tend to be discovered 
at high level of generality.  As such, they are, by themselves, incapable of 
specifying results in litigated cases.  To decide specific cases, practitioners 
of constitutional construction supplement them by applying some “norma-
tive theory for how to construe a constitution when its meaning runs out.  
There is no escaping this.”54  By hypothesis, this “normative theory” is not 
uniquely determined by the constitutional text. Lawrence Solum makes this 
clear.  Interpretation is a matter of “fact.”  But 
[c]onstitutional construction is not driven by facts in the same way.  Rather, 
construction is essentially driven by normative concerns.  There may be disa-
greements about what kinds of norms are relevant and whether those norms 
should be considered on particular issues in particular cases, or whether the rel-
evant norms operate systematically.  Moreover, some theories of constitutional 
construction may be driven by considerations of political morality, whereas 
other theories may look to norms that are internal to legal practice.  The ab-
stract fact that construction is essentially normative does not entail any particu-
lar account of the norms that ought to govern the practice of construction.55 
Construction, that is, necessarily requires “judgments and choices.”56  As 
the quotation above indicates, Solum, who has offered the most extensive 
and thorough treatments of construction, provides little guidance for evalu-
ating competing techniques of construction.  Indeed, he says “the important 
point is that there are several possible approaches to the construction zone 
 
 51 BARNETT, RESTORING AT 261-68; Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution Libertarian? 2008-09 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 25-26. 
 52 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM at 14, 260. 
 53 Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 
479-80 (2013).  See also id. at 501 (“The constitutional doctrines that are associated with the 
phrases have legal content that is richer than the communicative content of the provisions in 
which the phrases occur.”).  For a sampling of the kinds of practices having varying degrees of 
connection with the constitutional text that might lay claim to the title “construction”, see Ethan 
J. Ranis, Note, Loose Constraints: The Bare Minimum for Solum’s Originalism, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
765, 773-76 (2015). 
 54 Barnett, Interpretation at 70.  See also Solum, Interpretation-Construction at 104; Lawson, supra 
note 1, at 815-16. 
 55 Solum, Originalism at 472 (emphasis added). 
 56 Whittington, Constructing at 121-22. 
12 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 
that are consistent with the core commitments of originalism. . . .”57  In 
keeping with this understanding, Jack Balkin has identified eleven kinds of 
appropriate argument - arguments from 
“text . . . structure . . . purpose . . . consequences . . . precedent . . . conventi
on . . . custom . . . natural law . . . national ethos . . . political tradi-
tion . . . [and] honored authority” – any or all of which may be plausibly 
employed in arriving at a given construction.58 
We need to remember what this entails.  “Constitutional” adjudications 
bind the state - in all its manifestations - and everyone else.59  When judi-
cial decisions are founded on constructions, however, they are not “textual 
imperatives.”60  Instead, as one critical analysis accurately puts it, judges in 
matters of construction are deemed to have “discretion to resolve ambigui-
ties and vague terms based on extra-constitutional considerations.”61  Each 
judge must select what he or she decides is the appropriate “normative the-
ory.”  Admittedly, such a theory will be connected in one way or another to 
the constitutional text.  Inevitably, however, it will also be determined, in 
more or less substantial part, by the judges’ own estimation of the right 
principles that ought to govern society.62  In the case of judgments of con-
stitutional courts of last resort those decisions will be unreviewable.  Balkin 
puts it clearly: The “courts [may] require the political branches to act with-
in a set of principles, rules, and reasons that courts construct in order to 
maintain their legitimacy and the legitimacy of the political system.”63  
Courts thus act not just as law-appliers but as independent formulators and 
enforcers of political values.  They add “an additional supermajoritarian re-
quirement to . . . American democracy.”64 
Insofar as construction is conceptually independent of interpretation, 
one can, without self-contradiction, first practice an originalist method of 
interpretation and then go on to the distinct activity of construction.  But it 
does not follow that adjudication founded on construction is “consistent 
 
 57 Solum, Originalism at 473. 
 58 Jack Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORD. L. REV. 641, 659-60 (2013) 
(hereinafter Balkin, New Originalism). 
 59 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the 
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”). 
 60 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION at 8. 
 61 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009). 
 62 Solum says that recognition of significant opportunities for constitutional construction “does not 
entail the conclusion that individual judges have discretion to make decisions based on their own 
views of political morality.”  He then lists at least five possible approaches to construction not 
including “theories  . . .  driven by considerations of political morality” (see the quotation in text 
at note 55 supra) and acknowledges that there are and will continue to be “disagreements about 
the best approach.”  Solum, Originalism at 523. 
 63 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM at 301. 
 64 Id. at 326. 
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with the core commitments of originalism.”65  If it is anything, originalism 
is the belief that public power should be controlled mainly, if not exclusive-
ly, by application of the rules of the original constitution.66  But, by defini-
tion, binding decisions emerging from constitutional construction must be 
founded on considerations not exclusively derivable from the original con-
stitution.  As Mike Rappaport has concluded: “If the Constitution is defined 
as the original meaning of the words in the document—the standard defini-
tion of originalists - . . . the judge who decides a matter in the construction 
zone is not deciding the matter based on the Constitution.”67  The breadth 
of options that might lay claim to the label of constitutional construction, 
moreover, is in tension with the constraint and rule-of-law values that are 
usually associated with originalism.68 
Solum has properly asserted that originalists must, at a minimum, rec-
ognize a “Constraint Principle,” namely that “constitutional actors (e.g. 
judges, officials, and citizens) ought to be constrained by the original 
meaning when they engage in constitutional practice.”69  It is no accident, 
therefore, that Randy Barnett first articulated his version of construction in 
an article entitled “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists.”70  Keith Whitting-
ton makes this contrast explicit, noting the option of “supplement[ing] 
originalist constitutional interpretation with nonoriginalist constitutional 
construction.”71  In the context of constitutional adjudication, the endorse-
ment of constitutional construction amounts to the “view that courts are au-
thorized to impose constitutional rules other than those adopted by the con-
stitutional [enactors],” a position that more or less defines nonoriginalism.72 
 
 65 Solum, Originalism at 473 (emphasis added). 
 66 Solum puts the matter in a slightly looser form.  “Almost all originalists agree that the original 
meaning ought to make a substantial and important contribution to constitutional doctrine, and 
most originalists make the stronger claim that this contribution ought to constrain constitutional 
doctrine (absent very good reasons for departure from the original meaning).”  Lawrence Solum, 
What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 36 (Grant Huscroft & Brad-
ley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 67 Mike Rappaport, Does a Judge Who Decides a Matter within the Construction Zone Enforce the 
Constitution? A Question About Construction, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LAW & LIBERTY (Aug. 4, 
2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/08/04/does-a-judge-who-decides-a-matter-within-the-
construction-zone-enforce-the-constitution-a-question-about-construction/. 
 68 See Colby, supra note 28 at 749-51; Richard S. Kay, “Originalist” Values and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 335 (1996). 
 69 Solum, Originalism at 456. 
 70 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,” 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
 71 Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 403 
(2013)(hereinafter Whittington, Critical). See also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What 
Distinguishes New Originalism From Old., 82 FORDHAM L. REV.545, 556, 568, 568 n. 76. 
 72 Whittington, Critical at 408. “There can be no originalist answer to the question of which con-
struction to apply; by definition, construction supplements interpretation and cannot be dictated 
by it.” Colby, supra note 28 at 734. On the affinity of the “new originalism” to “nonoriginalist” 
interpretation see James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORD. L. REV. 
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III. THE INESCAPABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
Central to constitutional construction is the peculiar assumption that 
there are controversies that are, at the same time, controlled by the Consti-
tution but for which the Constitution provides no rule of decision. It con-
templates, that is, adjudications the binding force of which are premised on 
the constitutional text but which are decided, at least in part, on the basis of 
extra-textual considerations.  It is hard to reconcile this picture of constitu-
tional decision-making with the traditional American theory (although per-
haps not the traditional practice) of constitutional adjudication. That theory 
is usually associated with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison.73  Constitutional judicial review was legitimized in that judgment 
solely as a vindication of the authority of the constitutional text. “[C]ourts 
as well as other departments are bound by that instrument.”  A court may 
only “say what [that] law is.”74 
Constitutional construction, on the other hand, presumes that the text 
cannot determine for the judge “what the law is.”  It lacks the resources to 
enable a court to move seamlessly from the moment of interpretation to the 
moment of construction.  So, Keith Whittington has stated that a “precondi-
tion” of construction is for “parts of the constitutional text [to] have no dis-
coverable meaning.”75  “There will be occasions when the Constitution as 
written cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinative answer to a 
given question.  This is the realm of construction. . . .”76 Randy Barnett as-
serts that the constitutional text does not always contain “enough infor-
mation to resolve a particular issue without something more.”77  Sometimes 
this deficiency is premised on the limited substantive scope of the written 
rules.78  More often, however, it is based on the inherent uncertainty of 
constitutional language.  Such language might rule out certain applications 
but others will remain intrinsically controvertible.  So Barnett poses rhetor-
ical questions: “What is a ‘reasonable’ search? For that matter, what exact-
ly is a ‘search?’”79 
The idea that constitutional construction is inevitable, therefore, follows 
from assumptions about the practical limits of constitutional interpretation.  
 
433 (2013)(discussing changes in the landscape of constitutional theory from 1996 to 2013); Pe-
ter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism? 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707 
(2011). 
 73 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 74 Id. at 177. 
 75 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION at 7. This and the following quotations were 
directed specifically at the United States Constitution. There is no reason, to think, however that 
the same assertions might not be made about any constitutional text. 
 76 Whittington, Constructing at 121. 
 77 Barnett, Interpretation at 67. 
 78 See Whittington, Constructing at 130. 
 79 Barnett, Interpretation at 68-69. See text at notes 82-88 infra. 
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The proponents of constitutional construction all subscribe to an originalist 
method of interpretation, one that directs interpreters, and especially consti-
tutional courts, to identify and apply the “original meaning” of the constitu-
tional text.  These advocates of construction have necessarily decided that 
an investigation of original meaning will often be inadequate to decide cer-
tain controversies.80  According to Solum, “if our best interpretation yields 
underdeterminate communicative content, then we need to do something 
and by definition that something will be construction.”81 
This conclusion, however, depends on a prior assumption about how we 
identify “original meaning.”  It presupposes that the object of interpretation 
is the meaning the relevant language would have held for some hypothet-
ical speaker and reader of English at the time that the provision at issue was 
enacted.  This understanding is sometimes called “original public meaning” 
originalism and sometimes “new originalism.”  But while widely held, this 
position is controversial even among originalists.  As the label, “new 
originalism” suggests, there is also an “old originalism.”  That version 
looks for the meaning that was actually held by the particular human beings 
whose assent made the Constitution law.82  The “new originalists,” on the 
other hand, emphatically exclude any inquiry into the actual intentions of 
the constitution-makers.  Meaning is to be inferred exclusively from the 
text understood against the linguistic and political background of the time 
of its utterance. 
There is a crucial relationship between the “new originalist” choice of 
textual over intended meaning and the claimed necessity of constitutional 
construction.  A text considered by itself will very often be compatible with 
more than one possible meaning.  Only one of those meanings, however, 
will coincide with the communicative intention of the text’s author.  Kent 
Bach has noted the “truism” that “linguistic meaning generally underde-
termines speaker meaning.”83  The academic explication of constitutional 
construction generally assumes two different kinds of linguistic uncertain-
ty—vagueness and ambiguity.84  “Ambiguous” language has two possible 
 
 80 See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (2012)(hereinafter, 
Lawson, Dead Document). 
 81 Lawrence Solum, Thoughts About Rappaport’s Question About Construction, LEGAL THEORY 
BLOG, (August 6, 2015), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2015/08/thoughts-about-
rappaports-question-about-construction.html. 
 82 See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 703, 714-19 (2009) (hereinafter Kay, Original Intention) and authorities cited. 
On the identification of the original enactors see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original In-
tention in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 
229-36 (1988) (hereinafter Kay, Adherence). 
 83 Kent Bach, Context ex Machina, in SEMANTICS VS. PRAGMATICS (ed. Zoltan Gendler Sabo, 
2005) 15, 16, 26-27. 
 84 Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon, 051, Vagueness and Ambiguity, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon /2006/08/legal_theory_le_html. 
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but clearly distinct meanings. Context, will usually be sufficient to make 
one of those meanings inapposite in a certain text without further recourse 
to an investigation of what the authors actually intended.85  Language ex-
hibits “vagueness,” on the other hand, when its meaning is unclear because 
the exact boundaries of its referent are undefined.  Words like “tall” or 
“bright” or “faithful” fall into this category.  The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution barring “unreasonable searches and seizures” is 
a vague constitutional term.  The uncertainty associated with a vague ex-
pression appears as soon as we inquire whether a particular thing or activity 
is or is not covered by the rule containing it.  Just knowing how certain 
words were generally used at the time of utterance might rule some alterna-
tives in or out.86  But there will be many cases in which that information by 
itself will be insufficient to reach such a conclusion.  It is not just that we 
don’t know enough about standard usage at the relevant time.  Even if we 
knew everything there was to know about linguistic practice, we would still 
be at a loss to say whether certain acts were or were not within a rule’s ex-
tension.  Consequently, “original meaning is bound to run out when the 
semantic content of the Constitution is vague.” 87  Rule appliers will then 
turn to construction. 
Many provisions of the United States Constitution will yield reasonably 
determinate rules when examined in context.  In those cases, there will be 
little room for construction.  For the most part, however, disputes about 
these more precisely specified terms rarely come to litigation.  It is the oth-
er, the vague kind of textual provision—freedom of speech, due process, 
reasonable search—that spawns the greatest volume of constitutional dis-
putes. It follows that creative judicial constitutional construction will not be 
the exception.  It will be the usual method of constitutional adjudication.88 
 
 85 Solum, supra note 1. There may be rare cases of “irreducible ambiguity” where these resources 
are inadequate to indicate the more likely correct of the two meanings. See Solum, Originalism at 
470. Note, however, that when we do decide between the alternate possible meanings of an am-
biguous term based on the surrounding context, we are likely to base that conclusion on what we 
think the typical reader would infer about what the writers of a legal text must have intended 
when they used those words in that kind of communication. See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn 
Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 654-56 (2005). 
 86 See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption about Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 615, 634-36 (2009) [hereinafter Barnett, Assumptions]. 
 87 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL 
THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-le.html 
(last modified Sept. 3, 2015).  See also Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of 
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 61 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, 
Fixation].  Solum, Originalism at 470; BARNETT, RESTORING at 122; Colby, supra note 28 at 
732. 
 88 See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM at 104; BARNETT, RESTORING at 396 (“[I]n 99.9% of 
constitutional cases courts are engaged in constitutional construction . . .”); Randy E. Barnett, 
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMM. 
257, 263 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping].  See also Smith, supra note 72, at 709, 734; 
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This conclusion, however, follows only because of the new originalist 
decision to reject intended meaning for public meaning.89  If we adopted 
the “old originalist” inquiry into the meaning actually intended by the hu-
man beings whose assent made the Constitution law, identification of the 
correct meaning even of vague language looks much more practicable.  
That is because the resources for defining the boundaries of the vague 
terms would be substantially enhanced.90  We know the constitution-
makers wanted to accomplish something when they enacted a rule.  They 
used language to mark out a category of actions for regulation or prohibi-
tion because they held certain beliefs about the best way to structure and 
limit the government.  They must have understood those words to signify 
things or categories of things that had certain characteristics that they be-
lieved called for this treatment.  An examination of the historical and polit-
ical context of that decision and the reasons for it that were expressed by 
the enactors provides much more information than an inquiry limited to 
“contemporary dictionaries, grammar books, and other indicia of public 
meaning.”91  We can derive a picture of actually intended meaning that is 
qualitatively richer than one inferred from an investigation that is restricted 
to standard language use at the time of enactment.92 
This more fruitful source of textual meaning is especially significant in 
the context of constitutional litigation.  Courts are never obliged to formu-
late some single, correct meaning of a term in the constitutional text.  They 
need only decide which of two meanings proffered by contending litigants 
is more likely correct:  Is stopping and frisking someone on reasonable 
suspicion that he or she is armed and dangerous an unreasonable search 
within the terms of the Fourth Amendment—or is it not such a search?93  
Given the wealth of information available about the evils that concerned 
that Amendment’s enactors, a competent judge will almost certainly be 
able to make an honest decision that one or the other claim about the scope 
 
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (2015) 
(“[C]onstruction plays a critical role – perhaps even the leading role – in constitutional adjudica-
tion.”). 
 89 Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, MINNESOTA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14-34 
1, 2, 31-32 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463366. 
 90 This kind of meaning was taken for granted by the first self-conscious originalist scholars.  See 
Kay, Original Intention at 704-05.  This “intentionalist” version of originalism is defended for 
independent reasons. Id.. at 712-25; Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English 
You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967, 974-82, 992-93 (2004). 
 91 Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1393, 1394 (2012).  An inquiry into the original intentions of some apparently vague terms 
might also show that they were intended in a narrower, technical legal sense.  See John O. 
McGinniss & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 
749-750 (2012). 
 92 See Kay, Adherence at 250-59. 
 93 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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of the rule is more probably correct.  So even if “historical evidence will 
not tell you whether the thermal imaging of a house is or is not a search,”94 
it may tell you whether the proposition that it is a search within the intend-
ed meaning of the Fourth Amendment is more or less probable than the 
proposition that it is not.  A judge’s confidence about such a conclusion, of 
course, will differ in different circumstances.  But with the exception to be 
discussed below, the relevant historical evidence of the intentions of the 
enactors is sufficiently dense that it will almost never result in a “tie.”95 
It is true that there may be one situation where available evidence will 
fail to identify a better answer to a disputed question of intended meaning.  
That is when there is no information at all as to whether or not a challenged 
action falls within the intended scope of the text relied on.  Most promi-
nently, there might be cases where the action at issue did not exist and 
could not have been foreseen by the people who made the Constitution.  Of 
course, no one would contend that something is not regulated by the consti-
tutional text just because we think the enactors did not have that very thing 
in mind in when the Constitution was enacted.  Like all legal rules, the pro-
visions of the Constitution describe categories of action.96  As noted, the 
extent of such a category, depends on the characteristics that the constitu-
tion-makers understood to define the criteria for inclusion or exclusion.  It 
requires no construction to conclude that television news is protected by 
“freedom of the press” or that torture by application of electric current is a 
prohibited “cruel and unusual punishment.”97 
We might imagine a case where the challenged activity is so different 
from anything the enactors could have contemplated that it will be impos-
sible to say that it was or was not in any of the regulated or prohibited cate-
gories that they promulgated.  But even in such a case, it does not follow 
that the activity is neither permitted nor prohibited by the Constitution un-
derstood according to the intentions of its creators.  Constitutional provi-
sions are of two types.  Sometimes they create legal agencies and define the 
extent of their authority, implicitly prohibiting the exercise of any other 
power.  Alternatively, they may recognize the prior existence of some enti-
ties and merely impose certain limits on their activities.  The appropriate 
forms of constitutional argument depend on the kind of constitutional rule 
 
 94 Barnett, Interpretation at 71. 
 95 See Kay, Adherence at 243-45, 254; Lawson, Dead Document at 1233.  McGinnis & Rappaport, 
supra note 91 at 773-75. 
 96 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 23-24 (1991). 
 97 I therefore disagree with Randy Barnett’s statement that “[t]here can be no purely historical an-
swer” to questions about the meaning of a constitutional term when “the object to which the term 
is applied did not exist at the time of the framing.”  BARNETT, RESTORING at 122.  The process 
of identifying the particular category of actions intended to be covered by broad constitutional 
terms is similar to what Solum calls “original conception interpretation.”  Solum, Fixation at 53-
56. 
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being invoked.  When the argument is about the first kind of rule, anyone 
defending a challenged act by the constitutionally created institution will 
have to show that it falls within the authority granted.  In contrast, an ar-
gument about the authority of a pre-existing but constitutionally limited en-
tity will require the challenging party to demonstrate that the act in ques-
tion was one withdrawn by the Constitution. 
The enactors of the 1787-1789 Constitution made clear their intention 
that the government of the United States was to be regulated mainly by the 
first kind of rule.  They thought, that is, that all of that government’s power 
was created and defined by the Constitution.  In defending the proposed 
Constitution, for example, James Wilson, one of its drafters, emphasized 
the difference, from the point of view of that constitution, between the 
states, “invested . . . with every right and authority which [the people] did 
not in explicit terms reserve” and the new federal government in which 
“the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not given, 
is reserved.”98  The Founders never tired of repeating that the Constitution 
established a federal government of “enumerated” powers and that those 
powers were “few and defined.”99  On top of this scheme, however, the en-
actors added some constitutional rules of the second kind, imposing some 
specific limitations, on the granted powers,.  Individual rights provisions 
are the most obvious examples.  It was fear that the creation of such consti-
tutional rights might obscure the more fundamental restriction of the Unit-
ed States government to the enumerated powers that stimulated the consti-
tution-makers to restate that principle with emphasis in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.100  The second kind of rule was also employed in the United 
States Constitution to limit the actions of the presumed and otherwise un-
regulated powers of the state governments.101 
With this background, we can return to the claim that there are some 
things about which the rules of the Constitution, interpreted according to 
the original intentions, have nothing to say.  Constitutional litigation chal-
lenging an action of the federal government can take only two forms corre-
sponding to the two kinds of rules just described.  In the first, the claim is 
that the government has exercised a power not granted to it by the Constitu-
tion.  Since the Constitution presumes that the federal government only has 
such power as the Constitution gives it, a challenge to a federal exercise of 
 
 98 James Wilson, State House Yard Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON 171, 171-72 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall, eds., Liberty Fund 2007). 
 99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison); No. 39, at 234 (James Madison); No. 14, at 
97 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
100 See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY 83-88 (2000).  Obviously, these citations are merely illustrative.  I find the evi-
dence for the proposition that this was the way the enactors understood the Constitution to be 
conclusive. 
101 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; amend. XIV. 
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power may only be rebutted by identifying the relevant granted power and 
showing that it covered the action in contest.  If we are, by hypothesis, in-
capable of concluding anything about whether the constitution-makers’ in-
tended meaning did or did not extend to that action, it will be impossible to 
make that showing.  In such a case, therefore, a court would have to con-
clude that the government was without constitutional power to perform the 
challenged act.  The second kind of constitutional claim will concede that 
the action in question was within a granted power but will nonetheless as-
sert that the particular exercise of that power transgressed some affirmative 
limit included in the constitutional text.  The same reasoning now applies to 
the challenging party.  If there is no information at all about the intended 
meaning of the cited rule insofar as it applies to the relevant facts, a party 
will be unable to show that the rule limited the granted power in the way 
claimed.  A court in such circumstances will be obliged to reject the consti-
tutional claim.  While this reasoning applies most naturally to the listed leg-
islative powers of Congress and the explicit limits to those powers, it is 
equally true for every granted power and every prohibition, including those 
relating to the executive and judicial branches.102 
This reasoning applies equally to cases where the activity of a state is 
alleged to violate the United States Constitution.  States were understood 
by the enactors to have authority that was prior to and independent of the 
federal constitution.103  They would, however, be subject to that constitu-
tion’s affirmative limits on their conduct.  They may not, for example, im-
pair the obligation of contract or deprive a person of liberty without due 
process of law.  Someone arguing that a state has violated the Constitution, 
therefore, must show the state’s conduct was within such a limiting rule.  
Again, if there is no information at all about whether or not that rule in-
cludes the action in question, a court would be obliged to hold it constitu-
tional.104 
 
102 Gary Lawson made a similar argument restricted to federal and state powers.  See Lawson, Dead 
Document at 1234-35. 
103 Of course, states that did not exist at the time the United States Constitution was enacted came 
into being through a procedure that is itself prescribed in it.  Once created, however, and from the 
Constitution’s own point of view, such states are treated as possessing powers identical to those 
of the original states and not as exercising some kind of granted or delegated power.  Puerto Rico 
v. Sanchez Valle, No. 15-108, slip op. at 11-12, n.5 (U.S. 2016); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 
573 (1911).  Note, moreover, that state constitutions may apply to claims about state power in 
the same way that the federal Constitution applies to claims about the powers of the federal gov-
ernment.  See Appeal of Norwalk St. Ry. Co., 69 Conn. 576, 584-90, 37 A. 1080, 1082-84 
(1897). 
104 I originally made this argument only in the context of the relative powers of state and federal 
governments under the United States Constitution.  See Kay, Adherence at 256.  Gary Lawson 
has taken a similar position.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 1 at 834-36; Lawson, Dead Document 
at 1234-35.  As the discussion in text indicates, however, its logic applies to actions by any entity 
once we have decided whether that entity’s power is either wholly created by or is merely limited 
by the constitution that is invoked. 
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It is important to stress that this reasoning does not depend on invoca-
tion of extra-constitutional “supplemental” or “default” rules.  It is, in that 
respect, different from a “presumption of constitutionality” premised on the 
political propriety of judicial deference to the electorally accountable 
branches.105  That kind of presumption eliminates indeterminate cases but it 
does so based on propositions that are not themselves inferred from the 
constitutional text. 106  In a recent essay, Lawrence Solum examined “de-
fault rules” advocated by Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen, two public 
meaning originalists.  Solum demonstrated that, contrary to the claims 
made for them, those rules could not be uniquely determined solely from 
consultation of the text and structure of the Constitution, even when under-
taken in the context of its enactment.107  He concluded that “these are nor-
mative arguments about the best construction and not linguistic arguments 
about communicative content.”108 
In contrast, the assumptions about constitutional rules that I have out-
lined are not supplements to the Constitution.  They are conclusions about 
the meaning of the Constitution.  It is true that the bare constitutional text 
has “nothing that speaks to the general interpretive approach to be taken 
toward the document.”109  Once we consult the voluminous evidence of the 
original intentions, however, it is clear that these assumptions were part and 
parcel of the constitution-makers’ design. 110  The abundant historical mate-
 
  The same reasoning would apply in the rarer cases when a constitutional rule is claimed to regu-
late the conduct of an individual.  Constitutions presume the existence of, they do not constitute 
or define the powers of individuals.  It will, therefore, be up to a claimant to show that a chal-
lenged individual action is within a proscription or in a field of regulation of a limiting constitu-
tional rule. 
105 See James B. Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (arguingthat courts should defer to legislatures and should only de-
clare a legislative act unconstitutional if the act undoubtedly violates the constitution); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183-97 (2d ed. 1986) (observing the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to decide certain issues on political question grounds); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So Help Me God: Un-Writing Am-
ar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1385, 1395-96 (2014) (book review)(hereinafter 
Paulson, The Text) (arguing that, by default, the judiciary should defer to the legislature when 
reasonable minds could differ on a matter of constitutional interpretation); Lawson, supra note 1 
at 834-36. For a helpful modern exposition of this view see MICHAEL J. PERRY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 41-50 (2009). 
106 See Whittington, Constructing at 127-28 (arguing that adopting a  “clear mistake rule” is a politi-
cal choice beyond the strict confines of the constitutional text). 
107 See Solum, Originalism at 511-21 (assertingthat Thayerianism is not grounded in the constitu-
tional text, but requires extra-legal normative justifications). 
108 Id. at 521. In a subsequent publication, Paulsen explicitly refers to a default of deference to the 
political branches as a “construction.” Paulsen, The Text at 1435-36; see also note 109 infra. 
109 Whittington, Critical at 396 (2013) 
110 Michael Paulsen argues that “where it cannot be said that the actions of the political branches are 
contrary to a rule of law supplied by exegesis of the text . . . then the actions of the political 
branches must stand.” Paulsen, The Text at 1437. This “construction” applies when constitutional 
language is “indeterminate,” and may be “fairly discerned from the text itself.” Paulsen, Id. at 
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rial, makes clear that the Constitution was intended by its enactors to be an 
exclusive statement of the powers of the new government.111  Showing the 
contrary would require convincing evidence of real historical intentions.  It 
would demand, that is, more than an inspection of English usage at the end 
of the eighteenth century.112 
If we accept this interpretation of the Constitution, there will be no cas-
es in which a court will be unable decide which of the two contested posi-
tions is more probably consistent with its rules.  Either there will be evi-
dence about the intended meaning that will point one way or the other or 
there will be no evidence and the nature of the constitutional allocation of 
power will decide the case.  There will, of course, be cases where the 
amount and the force of evidence of the rule’s intended meaning will be in 
contest.  In such cases a court is obliged to make the best determination it 
can based on the available information.  But there are no omitted cases, no 
litigated “constitutional issue on which the text [is] silent” and, consequent-
ly, no need for “construction [to] fill the gap.”113  At least in litigated cases, 
interpretation never “runs out.”114  We never require “something beyond 
interpretation in order to develop fully [the Constitution’s] meaning.”115 
This reasoning depends crucially on our ability to examine the Consti-
tution’s meaning by investigating the actual human intentions that underlay 
the choice of a cited constitutional rule or the nature of a constitutional al-
location of authority.  We can only make the necessary judgments if we are 
able to examine the dense historical record about what the constitutional 
enactors intended to accomplish when they approved the language of the 
rules invoked.  The impoverished kind of reading enjoined by the advo-
cates of “public meaning” originalism, on the other hand, will necessarily 
turn up many more cases where one meaning is no more probable than an-
other.  That is because there will be frequent cases in which both proffered 
 
1436-37.  The resulting rules for adjudication are similar to those I have outlined. But, as with the 
default rules criticized by Solum discussed in the text, this presumption cannot be deduced from 
an examination that is limited to the words of the Constitution. The “text, structure and logic” of 
the Constitution is consistent with a number of different and conflicting background rules includ-
ing one that supposes that the Constitution’s rules are to be treated as limits on a pre-existing 
plenary power. We know that the Constitution is a grant of exclusive powers to the United States 
but we know it only by examining the intentions of the human beings who enacted it. 
111 So it is not enough to say, as Keith Whittington does, that “[i]t is possible that the Constitution 
does not include such closure rules or that any such supplementary interpretive rules that it does 
include are not complete.” WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 8 (emphasis 
supplied). As a matter of historical fact, American constitutions were intended to be and have 
been understood to be of the kind that I have described in the text. 
112 It should be stressed that we only need to rely on this ground of constitutional decision-making in 
the rare cases where the evidence of the intended scope of the particular rule cited is insufficient 
to tell us whether one position or another is more probably within its extension. 
113 Solum, Interpretation-Construction at 107. 
114 Supra note 31. 
115 WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION at 7. 
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meanings will be consistent with the language as it might have been under-
stood by the reasonable English-speaker at the time of enactment.116  The 
distinction between vague and ambiguous terms which is so significant for 
the proponents of constitutional construction117 loses much of its salience 
once we abandon the idea that we are restricted to public meaning. There 
really may be no single public meaning of a vague provision; that kind of 
interpretation really may “run out.”118  When, in contrast, we ask about the 
intended meaning of a vague phrase, we can usually learn a great deal 
about the range of conduct its enactors wanted to regulate.  With that 
knowledge we will be able to decide which of the proffered meanings is 
more consistent with the intended meaning of the text. 
The preference for “new,” original public meaning originalism and the 
need for constitutional construction are logically connected.  Anyone em-
bracing the former presumes an incomplete constitution and may need to 
look, in one form or another, to the latter to decide certain constitutional 
disputes.  There will be, that is, frequent occasions on which courts will act 
on grounds that are not derived exclusively from the written constitution.119  
We might, in fact, ask whether the possibility of such construction is not 
one of the main attractions of the public meaning approach.  As noted, 
much modern American constitutional adjudication has been based on the 
“vaguest” provisions in the text.120  These terms can have no unique origi-
nal public meaning and, therefore, they provide numerous opportunities for 
 
116 Colby, supra note 28 at 732. 
117 See supra text at notes 83-88; see also Barnett, Interpretation at 67-69; Solum, Interpretation-
Construction at 97-98. 
118 Randy Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 419 (2013). 
119 This is hardly the only, or even the most important, trouble with public meaning originalism. The 
foremost difficulty is the necessary severance it works between the applied meaning and the po-
litical facts that make the constitution legitimate and binding. I discuss this and other problems 
attached to this form of originalism in Kay, Original Intention at 714-19. A clear recent recapitu-
lation of this flaw is Richard Ekins, Objects of Interpretation, 32 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 
Winter 2017). 
  I do not discuss here the claim that an originalism that adheres to the actual intentions of the con-
stitution-makers is impossible and that, therefore, public meaning originalism is the only practi-
cal version on offer. Original intentions are claimed to be inaccessible because of the historical 
difficulties involved in reconstructing them, because it is impossible to collate the intentions of 
individual enactors in such a way as to identify a sensible collective intention for the adopted text 
or because it actually contradicts the enactors’ interpretive intention—that their substantive in-
tentions should not control. I have responded to these arguments more than once. See, e.g., Kay, 
Adherence at 236-59; Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 35-39 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); Kay, Original Intention 
at 709-14. I do not believe my arguments on these questions have been refuted and, in fact, with 
rare exceptions, such refutations have not been attempted. A notable exception is Lawrence So-
lum’s discussion of the problem of summing multiple intentions in Semantic Originalism  42-49 
(Illinois Public Law and Legal Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. Solum’s argument is serious but for reasons beyond the scope 
of this paper, I find it ultimately unconvincing. 
120 See Balkin, New Originalism at 646. 
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constitutional construction.  The resulting judicial decisions have had and 
will continue to have a far-reaching impact on the shape and functioning of 
American political society.  Public meaning interpretation and constitution-
al construction overtly commit those decisions to a judicial process that is 
“not primarily legal but political.”121  The factors that are suggested to de-
fine such constitutional construction are so general that they would be un-
likely to impose any genuine restraint, even if some uniform version of 
them were adopted by constitutional judges.122  Indeed, in an early exposi-
tion, Keith Whittington opined that, since it was “not grounded in discover-
able meaning,” there were “genuine limits to the ability of rational argu-
ment to fulfill the needs of construction.”123 
The consequence has been what one would expect.  Academic practi-
tioners of construction have described its applications in very different 
ways.  Two serious constitutional scholars, Randy Barnett and Jack Balkin, 
came around to originalism only after public meaning interpretation and 
constitutional construction were available, allowing them to adopt it in this 
new malleable version.  The resulting constitutional regimes they discov-
ered have certain overlapping features.  Mainly, however, they have arrived 
at starkly different catalogs of the powers granted to or withdrawn from 
American governments.  Using the combination of public meaning inter-
pretation and constitutional construction, Barnett concluded that the federal 
government was given a far narrower authority than the one commonly pic-
tured in modern constitutional jurisprudence.  The legislative reach of state 
governments would be similarly limited by a constructed presumption 
against any regulation that impinged on natural rights—including the right 
to hold and use property.124  Balkin, on the other hand, using basically the 
same tools–public meaning interpretation and constitutional construction—
found  that the Constitution permitted a large, vigorous and adaptable wel-
fare state on both state and federal levels.125  In each case, these visions 
largely coincided with the ones held by these scholars in their non-
originalist days. 
Public meaning constitutional interpretation/constitutional construction, 
therefore, seems to lead to a legal-political system the shape of which is, in 
 
121 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION at ix. But see BARNETT, RESTORING 124-27 
(denying that constitutional construction guided by the Constitution’s abstract values is political.) 
122 See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM at 14 (“[W]here the text offers an abstract standard or 
principle, we must try to determine what principles underlie the text in order to build construc-
tions that are consistent with it . . . .  Indeed, the fact that adopters chose text that features general 
and abstract concepts is normally the best evidence that they sought to embody general and ab-
stract principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be worked out and im-
plemented by later generations.”) 
123 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION at 210. 
124 BARNETT, RESTORING at 273-338, 369-89, 403-08. 
125 LIVING ORIGINALISM supra note 50 at 138-82, 282-85, 317-19. 
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the last analysis, substantially committed to a series of fresh political 
choices made by judges of the court of last resort.  There are doubtless at-
tractions to this model of public decision-making, one where our collective 
decisions are not constrained by an arguably out-of-date set of constitution-
al rules.  Our social welfare might be enhanced by vesting power to modify 
the actions of politically accountable officials in an unelected group of ex-
perts who attempt to make those actions better conform to shared funda-
mental values.126  We should be clear, however, that this model is pro-
foundly at odds with a central assumption of constitutionalism:  Living 
under a constitution is supposed to provide some clear rules for what the 
state may and may not do to us.  It is true that no theory of constitutional 
adjudication can eliminate all uncertainty about the precise reach of consti-
tutional rules; even good faith inquiries into the intentions of the enactors 
of a constitutional text are sure to result in disagreements in close cases.  
But the intended meaning of constitutional provisions is a matter of genu-
ine historical fact for which there will be objective, if not always conclu-
sive, evidence.  Constitutional construction, on the other hand, is essential-
ly a process of decision-making that involves evaluation of the relative 
merits and weight of the broad historical and contemporary principles and 
values that are thought to underlie our social and political institutions.  
There simply is no fact of the matter about the correct construction appli-
cable to a particular controversy.  Constitutional construction, at its heart, 
puts its trust in human judgment not in historically fixed rules.  This is—
not to put too fine a point on it—the opposite of constitutionalism.  It is at 
least incongruous that this state of affairs is to be administered citing the 
authority of the written constitution. 
 
126 I put to one side the question of whether, if we had such guardians, we would seek out people 
with the characteristics typically found in appellate judges. 
